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Autonomy and the Thirteen Colonies: Was the
American Revolution Really Necessary?*
Robert A. Friedlander**
Nothing better illustrates the almost insurmountable difficulties
faced by modern pluralistic societies in dealing with recalcitrant
minorities on the transnational level than the futile attempts to grant
autonomy to dissident populations.1 It has been particularly frustrating
for democratic regimes when minority rejectionists have turned to
terror-violence as their ultimate political weapon, with Ireland, Spain,
and Israel the preeminent contemporary examples. The Northern Irish
Parliament is indefinitely suspended,2 home rule has failed to end
Basque extremism,'. and the Camp David accords face an uncertain
future.' In each case, autonomy has been the chosen method of conflict-
resolution and despite offers of-or attempts at-self-government, con-
flict continues.
Throughout modern history in both theory and practice, autonomy
has been at best inherently suspect. In those few historical instances
when it was actually attempted, autonomy either worked very badly or
not at all. There is even reason to believe that autonomy as a legal
norm really does not exist. For example, statehood in contemporary in-
ternational law requires a permanent population, a defined territory,
*An earlier version of this article was presented January 30, 1980, at the University of
Tel-Aviv Conference on Models of Autonomy, Tel-Aviv, Israel.
**B.A., 1955, M.A., 1957, Ph.D., 1963 History, Northwestern University; J.D., 1973,
DePaul University. Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University.
1. Iran is presently experiencing severe internal disruptions with respect to dissi-
dent minorities, particularly the Kurds. See Harris. Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds, 433
ANNALS 112, 113-15, 122-24 (1977); Hempstone, Khomeini's "Feast of Blood," NEW
REPUBLIC, Sept. 22, 1979, at 18-21; NEWSWEEK, Sept. 10, 1979, at 36; U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Jan. 14, 1980, at 27-28. The acrimonious Canadian debate over Quebec separatism
continues with Premier Ren6 Levesque's proposed referendum being an admixture of
autonomy and sovereign independence. See, e.g., The Gazette (Montreal), Dec. 21, 1979, at
1. 8-11.
2. See R. HULL, THE IRISH TRIANGLE, CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 109-11, 116-17
(1976); Bishop, Law in the Control of Terrorism and Insurrection" The British Laboratory
Experience, 42 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 140 (1978).
3. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1979, § A at 11, col. 5; Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1979, §
A at 11, col. 1; The Blade (Toledo), Oct. 28, 1979, § A at 3, col. 3; Jerusalem Post, Jan. 30,
1980, at 4, col. 4; Jerusalem Post, Feb. 4, 1980, at 5, col. 1.
4. Cf. Ball, The Coming Crisis in Israeli-American Relations, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 231,
242-56 (1979-80); Heller, Begin's False Autonomy, 37 FOREIGN POL. 111 (1979-80). Both ar-
ticles are sharply critical of Israeli policy, but the former goes ultra vires when it seeks to
legitimate PLO terrorism.
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an organized government, and a capacity to enter into relations with
other states.' Autonomous regimes by definition lack the final element
in that formula, and thus they fail to meet the minimal standard for
recognition of independent governance.
Autonomy relationships during the twentieth century were mainly
designed as placebos to frustrate independence movements and to off-
set secessionist pressures. Whether created for colonial dependents by
controlling Mother Countries and mandatory powers, for victor com-
batants over vanquished enemies partially dismembered via peace set-
tlements, or for majority regimes confronted by an unassimilable
minority, autonomy has always been a stopgap measure. In almost
every instance, grants of autonomy were reluctantly given and
ungratefully received. The most recent example of an internal
autonomous remedy devised by a national governing authority for its
dissident regional minority is that of newly democratic Spain. Yet,
despite the Basque Autonomy Statute, Basque terrorism has not
abated, and violence continues to beget violence.
Those who seek to obtain a juridical definition of autonomy from in-
ternational law treatise books will quest in vain." Although self-
determination has been elevated by many to the status of an interna-
tional human "right," or at the very least a normative principle,'
autonomy has been often neglected and on occasion totally disregarded
by legal scholars and commentators Viewed from the perspective of
5. This is based upon Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights
and Duties of States, now generally accepted as the norm for state practice vis-a-vis
recognition. See J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 107-09 (8th ed. 1977)
[hereinafer cited as STARKE]; Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood in International Law,
48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 93, 111-39 (1976-77). The latter study draws a distinction between
"formal independence" and "actual independence." Id at 123-25.
6. See, e.g., M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d rev.
ed. 1977); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF PEACE (6th ed. H. Waldock 1963); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2d ed. 1973); W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1964); D. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1976); W. LEvI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION (1979); D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1970)
(2 vols.); C. RHYNE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE SUBSTANCE, PROCESSES, PROCEDURES AND IN-
STITUTIONS FOR WORLD PEACE WITH JUSTICE (1971); G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A
MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 1976); STARKE, note 5 supra; S. WILLIAMS & A. DE
MESTRAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
IN CANADA (1979).
7. See generally SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMEN-
SIONS (Y. Alexander & R. Friedlander eds. 1980).
8. J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 211-14 (1979)
(refers to autonomy as a stage "in the progress toward self-government," and pointedly
notes that autonomous regions are not considered to be states) [hereinafter cited as
CRAWFORD]; 3 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
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international law, autonomy is therefore an artificial concept of
dubious legal consequence. Admittedly, it still is invoked by politicians,-
historians, and political analysts, though its twentieth-century
historical role has only been that of a political instrumentality.
Autonomy may be roughly defined as self-regulation (sometimes mis-
takenly called home rule) subject to a superior sovereignty. Historical
practice has always placed the conduct of foreign relations under con-
trol of the lawful sovereign. This was as true of Canada in the late
nineteenth century as it is of the present day Transkei.' But even
when such a political remedy had been accepted by all parties in in-
terest, their parens patriae relationship eventually dissolved into
either separation or severance. The choice inevitably became outright
independence on the one hand or a loose associative arrangement like
the British Commonwealth on the other." No event more accurately
predicted these tensions and traumas than the revolt of the thirteen
American Colonies from Great Britain.
The American Revolution, along with its French counterpart, com-
bined to create a great historical watershed, and the impact of both
has been felt throughout the past two centuries. With regard to
autonomy, the American colonial experience first established a pattern
of separation later aspired to by other subject peoples." Yet, the col-
onial era was unique in its inception, for many of the American Col-
onies were self-regulated by their founders only to lose their
customary rights as trade and commerce prospered along with the
passing of the older generation.
From their very origin the American Colonies were founded by
religious and political dissenters." These individuals considered
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 507-15 (1976) (discusses
autonomy solely in the context of the United Nations legal system).
9. See J. BREBNER, CANADA: A MODERN HISTORY 283-91, 296, 413-15 (1970);
CRAWFORD, sUpra note 8, at 222-27.
10. Canada was granted membership in the League of Nations nearly a dozen years
before the Statute of Westminster (1931), which created the British Commonwealth. See
R. VEATCH, CANADA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 3-11 (1975).
11. The impact of the American Declaration upon independence declarations of new
twentieth-century nation states is obvious. See generally INDEPENDENCE DOCUMENTS OF
THE WORLD (A. Blaustein, J. Sigler & B. Beede eds. 1977).
12. De Tocqueville shrewdly observed: "It is not the happy and the powerful who go
into exile, and poverty with misfortune is the best-known guarantee of equality among
men." 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 33 (Trans. by G. Lawrence, J. Mayer
ed. 1969). See also 1 D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 5-9 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as BOORSTIN]; E. MORGAN, THE PURITAN DILEMMA: THE STORY OF JOHN
WINTHROP 34-53 (1958) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN]; Allemand, Two European Influences
on the American Revolution: Puritanism and John Locke, 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 805, 807-17
(1976).
1980
Duquesne Law Review
themselves to be outside the law and were viewed as such by the
British governing establishment (the socio-political composition of
which changed several times throughout the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries). This is not to say that economic considerations were
secondary in the founding of American colonial settlements, but rather
that the mercantile motivation of the Mother Countries, England par-
ticularly, became inextricably intertwined with religion and politics."
England encouraged such emigration. France did not. Holland lacked
sufficient population to people an empire. This simple demographic
statement explains in large part the British triumph in the acquisition
of North America.
Jamestown, the first English colony, was established under the
auspices of a mercantile joint stock venture chartered as the Virginia
Company. Originally founded in December, 1606, the Company was
reorganized with a new royal charter three years later, but failed to
live up to expectations and was dissolved in 1624. Virginia thus
became by default the first crown colony."' Of special significance was
the creation by corporation officers in London of a colonial General
Assembly in 1619, reaffirmed two years later in a formal constitution. 15
Why it happened is still somewhat inexplicable,"6 but the nature of that
happening is something of major importance. The language of the
Virginia Colony's constitution indicates that the colonists were to be
part of the governing process:
And this General Assembly shall have free power to treat, consult, and
conclude, as well of all emergent Occasions concerning the Publick Weal
of the said Colony and every Part thereof, as also to make, ordain, 'and
enact such general Laws and Orders, for the Behoof of the said Colony,
and the good Government thereof, as shall, from time to time, appear
necessary or requisite;... 17
The Virginia Assembly, though not immediately recognized by the
Crown after the imposition of royal control, was to continue, largely
13. The Mercantile impulse is explored in depth in M. KAMMEN, EMPIRE AND IN-
TEREST: THE AMERICAN COLONIES AND THE POLITICS OF MERCANTILISM 1-44 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as KAMMEN]. For shorter statements see D. LACY, THE MEANING OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 16-24 (1966) [hereinafter cited as LACY]; 1 S. MORISON, THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: PREHISTORY TO 1789, at 75-100 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as MORISON].
14. See MORISON, supra note 13, at 86-93.
15. 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3810-12 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) [hereinafter cited as COL-
ONIAL CHARTERS].
16. C. DEGLER, OUT OF OUR PAST: THE FORCES THAT SHAPED MODERN AMERICA 21 (rev.
ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as DEGLER].
17. COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 15, at 3811-12.
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through efforts of the colonists themselves. Finally, in 1637 the King
instructed the Governor to summon an Assembly, and in 1639 those in-
structions granted that body a permanent status.18 One cannot deny
the long-term effect of allowing a colonial legislature to exist contem-
poraneously with Parliament when the latter was supposed in law and
in fact to represent all English citizens. Crown and Parliament were at
that time caught up in a constitutional power struggle, and colonial
questions did not rate a high priority. But self-regulation then, as now,
first implanted the seeds of self-rule.
The famed Mayflower Compact, signed at Cape Cod during
November 1620, in the words of one distinguished American historian
"is an almost startling revelation of the capacity of Englishmen in that
era for self-government." 9 Not to be outdone, the Cambridge
signatories of the Massachusetts Bay Colony Charter in August 1629
agreed to transfer their government and its patent to the shores of
New England." "In this way the governor of the company could
become himself the governor of the colony, and the general court of
the company could become the legislative assembly of the colony."21
Here, too, the terms of the Charter authorized enactment of
wholesome and reasonable statutes, ordinances, and decrees which
would conform to the laws of England.' Though these documents and
their successors did not seem revolutionary to their contemporaries,
they had the effect of creating a dual legal system. This colonial con-
stitutionalisms was to be an important factor in the shaping of
American political thought.
Viewed through the reflective lens of historical perspective, the
Virginia and Massachusetts experiments laid the foundation for a dual
constitutional authority in almost every jurisdiction. The next and,
perhaps, most significant document in the development of American
self-regulation was the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut adopted in
1639. Distinguishing between its earlier mercantile and religiously
oriented predecessors, some scholars have looked upon it as the first
popularly based American fundamental law." It was soon followed by
18. DEGLER, supra note 16, at 21.
19. MORISON, supra note 13, at 94. See H. COMMAGER, THE EMPIRE OF REASON: How
EUROPE IMAGINED AND AMERICA REALIZED THE ENLIGHTENMENT 194 (1978) (calls that docu-
ment "[slurely the first authenticated instance of government by compact") [hereinafter
cited as COMMAGER].
20. MORGAN, supra note 12, at 45-48; MORISON, supra note 13, at 106.
21. MORGAN, supra note 12, at 46.
22. COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra note 15, at 1846-60.
23. The term is that of BOORSTIN, supra note 12, at 20.
24. See, e.g., B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
190-91 (1967) [hereinafter cited as BAILYN]. Contra, J. POMFRET, FOUNDING THE AMERICAN
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the Massachusetts "Body of Liberties" which was revised in 1647 and
finally published the following year. 25 Numerous colonial constitutions
and statutory compilations were to rely upon these earlier examples
and precedents, so that "[aill through the colonial era Americans went
from compact to compact.""
As the seventeenth century wore on, it became increasingly difficult
to distinguish between self-regulation and self-government.' Concern
with law and the establishment of legal relationships emerged as a
prime American characteristic within the first half-century of coloniza-
tion. Inevitably, "public freedom consisted in having a share in public
business." '28 This required a corpus of law and a profession of lawyers.
From its earliest beginnings, colonial governance had become institu-
tionalized," and individual rights were deemed to be part of the
governing process. Although based and modeled upon English law,
legal codes and administrative statutes invariably took on a distinctive
American coloration. The American colonists believed in their fun-
damental rights as Englishmen, but they also asserted those rights in
an American context. In the long run, "the just rights and privileges of
every freeman" became something other than what the English Parlia-
ment had in mind."0
One result was the creation of a professional American bar, meaning
not only paid attorneys, but, ultimately, the rise of an indigenous
judiciary. Technical English legal terminology was applied with in-
creasing frequency by a decided colonial accent. Most significant was
the slow but steady divergence between English theory and American
practice.8 1 "The New World abounded with legal problems for which
English precedents either did not exist, or were not available . . .. ,2
For its part, the English Crown never explicitly provided for the in-
COLONIES: 1583-1660, at 246 (1970) (maintains that "Connecticut copied its system from
Massachusetts with only one or two important differences") [hereinafter cited as
POMFRET].
25. BAILYN, supra note 24, at 194; BOORSTIN, supra note 12, at 23-24; POMFRET, supra
note 24, at 180.
26. COMMAGER, supra note 19, at 194.
27. See MORISON, supra note 13, at 111 ("During these two decades 1640-1660,
England's American colonies were left very much to themselves"); POMFRET, supra note
24, at 335 ("All in all, self-government made remarkable progress during the period before
1660").
28. H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 115 (1963) [hereinafter cited as ARENDT].
29. COMMAGER, supra note 19, at 198.
30. BAILYN, supra note 24, at 193-98.
31. See id at 197; BOORSTIN, 8upra note 12, at 26-28, 202-05.
32. BOORSTIN, supra note 12, at 203. For a discussion of the continuing transformation
of English Common Law in the post-Revolutionary century, see Friedlander, Social Util-
ity, Justice Holmes, and the American Transformation of the English Common Law, 26
CHITTY'S L.J. 279 (1978).
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troduction of the common law to any of the Colonies, since that would
have implied a reduction of the sovereign prerogative. The Royal
Government merely established the general principle that colonial
legislation should not be at odds with the laws of England. Growing
disharmony between the two in the next century would bring about
both legal confusion and political conflict.' Not without reason were
twenty-five of the fifty-six signatories to the Declaration of In-
dependence members of the bar."
Despite the Cromwellian interregnum, which, if anything, led to
greater self-regulation on the part of the Colonies, particularly in
Virginia, the English Metropolitan Government continued to extend its
sovereign authority but not necessarily its political control. Virginia,
which had first opposed Cromwellian rule, on March, 12, 1651, was con-
ceded extraordinary rights and privileges with respect to trade and
commerce by Cromwell's Council of State:
That the people of Virginia [shall] have free trade as the people of
England do enjoy to all places and with all nations according to the lawes
of that commonwealth, and that Virginia shall enjoy all priviledges equall
with any English plantations in America.
That Virginia shall be free from all taxes, customs and impositions
whatsoever, and none to be imposed on them without consent of the
Grand assembly, and soe that neither fforts nor castle bee erected or gar-
risons maintained without their consent.'
The agreement, however, was never published, and according to Jef-
ferson, every concession made by England was "violated by subse-
quent kings and parliaments."" Small wonder, then, that Virginia more
than a century later would become a seedbed of sedition and opposi-
tionist sentiment.
Until the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the establishment of
Parliamentary supremacy during the next century, Britain's relation-
ship to the American Colonies in view of the colonial assemblies was
less that of a Mother Country and her dependencies and more like a
government that was primus inter pares.s7 Charles II, during the
Restoration, followed a program of benign neglect. In fact, "[tjhe king
33. 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY
10-11 (J. Goebbel, Jr. ed. 1964).
34. BOORSTIN, supra note 12, at 205. But see J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 251 (1950) (notes the all too familiar disparity between the colonial
admiration for the profession of law on the one hand, and the evident popular distrust of
lawyers themselves on the other).
35. Quoted in T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 108 (T. Abernathy ed.
1964).
36. Id at 110.
37. C. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40-41 (rev.
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as ANDREWS].
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can hardly be said to have had a colonial policy."' But with the advent
of William and Mary, England slowly began to embark upon a new
economic and imperial course, when at the same time colonial commer-
cial interests, particularly the New England merchants, had come to
regard their interests as separate from their London counterparts. The
very fact of empire would prove to be an increasing strain, for British
mercantilism, like the Continental versions, was predicated upon a
dominant Mother Country and subservient colonies.
Winston Churchill the historian is as prone to hyperbole as was
Churchill the politician. His portrayal of a dramatic switch in English
policy after the Stuart Restoration leading to "unceasing conflict with
the colonial assemblies, who resented the threat to royalise and unify
colonial administration," is somewhat overstated, although the abortive
attempt by James II to extend royal power over New York and New
England proved indeed to be a harbinger of the future. 9 Subsequent to
the accession of William and Mary following the Bloodless Revolution
of 1688, Parliamentary mercantilism replaced royal mercantilism, and
imperial doctrines were pursued with far greater vigor than they had
been in the past.
Trade and commerce are the sinews of the state. They often serve
as ties that bind, and sometimes those ties tend to constrict. British
mercantilist theory emphasized monopoly, exploitation of natural
resources, a favorable balance of trade, a strong merchant marine, and
the attainment of national self-sufficiency by the colonizing power.
With respect to Britain's American colonies, this would be accom-
plished by means of the Navigation Acts, which required transporta-
tion of raw materials and finished goods to take place on British
ships.' "Mercantilist policy can be summed up as a patchwork of
restrictive laws conceived in a spirit of arrogance and administered
with an inefficiency that invited evasion."" Because of that inefficien-
38. KAMMEN, supra note 13, at 37-38.
39. 3 W. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES: THE AGE OF
REVOLUTION 139-40 (1957) [hereinafter cited as CHURCHILL].
40. For the theory and practice of British mercantilism, see id at 140-43; KAMMEN,
supra note 13, at 40-44; MORISON, supra note 13, at 188-91; 1 P. SMITH, A PEOPLE-S HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A NEW AGE Now BEGINS 133-41 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
SMITH]. As to the five basic elements comprising the British scheme, see 4 C. ANDREWS,
THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 13-21 (1938). For a detailed description of the
more rigorous legislation after 1600, and its practical effect, see id. at 55-84.
41. SMITH, supra note 40, at 140. Contra, CHURCHILL, 8upra note 39, at 143 ("The
system was more irksome on paper than in practice"); Bailyn, 1776 A Year of Challenge,
19 J.L. & ECON. 437, 465 (1976) (noting that the mercantilist system was "so complex it
could scarcely be understood, so irrational, it contradicted itself, so unenforceable it in-
vited wholesale evasion").
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cy, the main harm to American commerce in the seventeenth century
was psychological rather than economic.
Majoritarian historical interpretation treats the year 1763, which
marked the conclusion of the Seven Years' War and its American con-
comitant, the French and Indian War, as a significant turning-point for
British-American relations.'2 The Molasses Act, enacted a generation
earlier in 1733, actually had little effect besides reminding the Colonies
of their inferior imperial position, and it had been evaded by the col-
onists with successful impunity. 8 But the new King, George III, along
with the Ministry of George Grenville and its successors, determined
that the Americans should be made to pay their share of the costs of
empire. Whether this decision was made on the basis of apportioning
the burdens of war," or with the intention of forcing the colonists to
pay for the cost of maintaining an empire, particularly a military
presence in the New World,'" the net result was a growing divergence
between Britain's governing classes and their colonial dependencies.' 6
The Sugar Act, Quebec Act, Plantation Act, and Stamp Act appear to
some analysts and commentators as basically the source of taxation
disputes and quarrels over the costs of imperial policies.'7 Even so,
[f]rom the perspective of the administration of the colonies, it could be
argued the British government performed so badly, and with such entire
disregard of the principles of proper administration, that the wonder was
not that the colonies finally revolted but that they endured such blunders
and inequities as long as they did."
Actually, the stamp tax and its progeny were symptoms of a far more
serious disagreement, involving the nature of the constitutional rela-
tionship between Great Britain and her Colonies." The Colonial
42. See, e.g., ANDREWS, supra note 37, at 122-41; I. CHRISTIE & B. LABAREE, EMPIRE
OR INDEPENDENCE, 1760-1776, at 25-45 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CHRISTIE & LABAREE]; L.
GIPSON, THE COMING OF THE REVOLUTION, 1763-1775, at 1-9 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Gn'.
SON]; KAMMEN, aupra note 13, at 95-111; J. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
70-78 (1943) [hereinafter cited as MILLER]; MORISON, 8upra note 13, at 234-48.
43. ANDREWS, supra note 37, at 92, 130-31.
44. GIPSON, supra note 42, at 56; MORISON, upra note 13, at 247.
45. CHRISTIE & LABAREE, aupra note 42, at 30-32; CHURCHILL, supra note 39, at 170-71;
SMITH, supra note 40, at 166-70.
46. KAMMEN, upra note 13, at 119 (mentions "the incompatibility of British ad-
ministrative intentions with colonial commercial habits and aims").
47. See ANDREWS, supra note 37, at 129-42; B. BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 159-60 (1968); CHRISTIE & LABAREE, supra note 42, at 105-30, 254; GIPSON, aupra
note 42, at 55-100; MORISON, upra note 13, at 244-45. See also CHURCHILL, aupra note 39,
at 176 (maintains that "by the middle of 1770 reconciliation seemed complete").
48. SMITH, aupra note 40, at 141.
49. Jensen, Historians and the Nature of the American Revolution, in THE REINTER-
PRETATION OF EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN EDWIN POMFRET 107 (R.
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Assemblies rightly or wrongly believed their rights and their powers
to be under attack by the London Imperial Government. This led inex-
orably to the argument that Britain's attempts at taxation were un-
constitutional, since only the Colonies had the legal authority to tax
themselves."' Rejecting both the theory of virtual representation and
the possibility of actual representation,51 the American colonists looked
upon themselves as the defenders of traditional constitutional rights
and considered the Crown and Parliament to be the violators of legal
legitimacy.52 One respected scholar has written that popular conviction
in the Colonies held "America was destined to become the center of a
'Great Empire.' "" A better view is that the colonial legislatures had
been whittling away at sovereign control for a century and a half, and
when presented with the opportunity, they "could not resist the temp-
tation to finish the job.""
In the final analysis the growing cleavage between the disputants
was fundamentally political, though their rhetoric centered on legal
argumentation. The process of historical evolution between two in-
creasingly disparate peoples led almost directly to a revolutionary
mentality when fundamental interests continued to diverge. Despite
the Colonies' emphasis upon the rule of law, and despite their demands
for the preservation of historic liberties, the traditional rights which
they so boldly proclaimed actually translated into political freedom to
shape their own destiny. The autonomous child was now fully grown
and in the act of breaking away from parental control.55
Thus, the coming of the American Revolution was due in large,
measure to the violation of what the American colonists perceived to
Billington ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Jensen]; Peterson, Adams and Jefferson: A
Revolutionary Dialogue, 1 WILSON Q. 108, 115 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Peterson].
50. DEGLER, supra note 16, at 76-77; E. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763-89,
at 24-27 (1956) [hereinafter cited as THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC]; MORISON, 8upra note 13,
at 234-35. The Virginia Burgesses believed that "the Stamp Act and its successors
threatened the power of the Assembly itself." A. OLSON, ANGLO-AMERICAN POLITICS,
1660-1775: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTIES IN ENGLAND AND COLONIAL AMERICA 166
(1973). For a detailed study of the impact of the Stamp Act debate upon colonial in-
struments of governance, see Reid, In the First Line of Defense: The Colonial Charters,
the Stamp Act Debate, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv.
177 (1976).
51. THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 50, at 25-26.
52. W. LIPPMAN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 57-58 (1956). For the observations of a
member of the Continental Congress, see V. RAMSAY, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 8-9 (1789) [hereinafter cited as RAMSAY].
53. MILLER, supra note 42, at 434. If true, this would be the earliest expression of
Manifest Destiny.
54. THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 50, at 92.
55. See G. BEER, BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765, at 314-15 (1907); DEGLER, supra
note 16, at 80-82; MORISON, 8upra note 13, at 235 & 248.
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be their basic rights as Englishmen. Imperial legislation appeared to
be infringements upon the constitutional liberties guaranteed every
British citizen." In the words of Professor Bailyn, the American
Revolution "was above all else an ideological-constitutional struggle.157
It was also, in the eyes of some analysts, a conservative movement.M
Had not de Crevecoeur, in his Letters From an American Farmer
(1782), asserted that the American Revolution was a conspiracy of
"great personages" directed against the common man?59 Writing on the
eve of America's Bicentennial anniversary, a prominent political scien-
tist recalled the nation's conservative beginnings. The Declaration of
Independence, he argues, actually anticipated the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787. According to this thesis, the Declaration was not "a
radical manifesto calling for wide scale or fundamental social change,"
but rather reflected the "central elements of American thought."6'
American denial of Parliamentary supremacy lay at the heart of the
rebellion. Yet it is possible that modern-day hindsight may have given
to the events of 1770-1775 an historical certainty which was not
perceived by the participants themselves. Samuel Eliot Morison goes
so far as to claim that "[tihere was no American nationalism or
separatist feeling in the colonies prior to 1775."61 Jefferson's major
biographer insists that he and John Adams, as late as 1775, were still
seeking reconciliation and not revolution. The two had based their
hopes on being able to return to British constitutional principles, as
they understood them, and even continued their efforts for several
months after the fighting finally broke out. At first, both men merely
"supported armed resistance as a means of bringing Britain to her
senses and winning a settlement on American terms." 2 A contrary in-
56. See C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL IDEAS 80-134 (1958) [hereinafter cited as BECKER]; E. BURNETT, THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 53 (1941); Reid, In an Inherited Way: English Constitutional Rights, the Stamp
Act Debates, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1109,
1111-17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Reid]. Reid also insists that the shifting American
arguments merely represented good lawyering. Id. at 1110-11.
57. 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION viii (B. Bailyn ed. 1965).
58. See generally J. JAMESON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION CONSIDERED AS A SOCIAL
MOVEMENT (1926); C. ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC (1953); A. SCHLESINGER, THE
COLONIAL MERCHANTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1918).
59. Quoted in ARENDT, supra note 28, at 17. See Jensen, supra note 49, at 108 (com-
menting on "the fundamental importance of a few men in the revolutionary movement").
60. Carey, The Meaning of the Declaration, Wall St. J., July 2, 1976, at 6, col. 3. See
BECKER, supra note 56, at 23 (treats the bill as a "true bill" of indictment against the
British government); Reid, supra note 56, at 1126-27 (implies a similar viewpoint).
61. MORISON, supra note 13, at 245. Contra, Mason, America's Political Heritage:
Revolution and Free Goverment-A Bicentennial Tribute, 91 POLITICAL SCI. Q. 193, 196
(1976).
62. Peterson, supra note 49, at 115-16.
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terpretation is provided by a more critical American historian who
asserts that by the time of Lexington and Concord in April 1775, local
and state Committees of Correspondence "'had so far taken over all the
functions of government that not only had the legitimacy of British
rule disappeared, but also many of the formal institutions.""
Historical truth, if it exists, is often obscured by present-day
relativism. How else does one explain the absurd arguments that col-
onial patriots were twentieth-century terrorists in eighteenth-century
garb? The claim "that the use of purposeful terror for political ends
was an integral feature of the American Revolution"" is not only
feckless but fraudulent. Because terror-violence has unhappily been
utilized in the present era by so-called liberation groups seeking to in-
voke the principle of self-determination, and thereby making this claim
a license to kill, it is tempting to justify illegally proscribed means
through analogies to past experience. The assertion that American
Patriots in 1776 resorted to revolutionary terror against Loyalists and
British alike not only distorts past events but deprives them of any
significant meaning."' This misguided historicism does, however, il-
lustrate the difficulties attendant to the political disintegration of an
autonomous structure.
It may very well be that the Revolutionary spark was finally ignited
not by heroic deeds but by the words of Thomas Paine. His best-selling
pamphlet, Common Sense, stirred the Colonial imagination as no other
work had done. Although containing a vigorous constitutional defense
of the American position," it was in effect a call to arms: "the weeping
voice of nature cries, 'Tis time to part.' "67 A number of influential
historians are in agreement that Paine's contribution to the Revolu-
tionary spirit in 1776 was substantial and perhaps conclusive." Paine
also was in part responsible for the historical portrait of George III as
tyrant and as premier villain of the independence struggle. The stan-
63. Marina, The American Revolution and the Minority Myth, 20 MOD. AGE 298, 301
(1976).
64. Tierney, Terror at Home: The American Revolution and Irregular Warfare, 12
STAN. J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1977).
65. See id. at 6-7. See also Quainton, U.S. Prepares for Terrorism, 42 THE SHINGLE 8,
9 (1979). Mr. Quainton is Director of the United States State Department Office for Com-
batting Terrorism.
66. T. PAINE, COMMON SENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS 4-10 (N. Adkins ed.
1953).
67. Id. at 23.
68. E.g., Greene, Paine, America, and the "Modernization of Political Consciousness,
93 POLITICAL Sci. Q. 73, 74-77 (1978). See THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 50, at
72-74 (posits that Paine had in effect abandoned legal and constitutional arguments in
favor of " 'natural' rights"). See also RAMSAY, 8upra note 52, at 336-37 (notes that the pam-
phlets "produced surprising effects").
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dard judgment, however, is that George III accurately symbolized the
average Englishman: "narrow, insular, and contemptuous of
'colonists.'"" When autonomy had ceased to function, the Crown could
not, and did not, abandon its sovereign authority. Under these cir-
cumstances, conflict became inevitable.
Even the most conservative, imperial-minded of American historians
admits that the radical colonial leadership, by 1775, was demanding "a
larger measure of local autonomy than the government of the mother
country was prepared to grant."7 While there is good reason to think
that this is what the colonists thought they believed in the two years
before the outbreak of hostilities, the King and Cabinet had in fact
already rejected the American proposal for a constitutionally based
autonomous relationship. Writing in November, 1774, George III
resolutely declared: "We must either master them, or totally leave
them to themselves and treat them as Aliens."'" Thus, the parting of
the ways was rooted in political irreconcilability nourished in the soil
of self-governance. "It would have been impossible in 1770 to devise
any formula for British-American relations to which both Parliament
and the colonists could agree.""
There is a school of historians which believes that during the last
half of the eighteenth century, western civilization had entered into an
age of democratic revolution, and that this was an Atlantic rather than
a mere American or European phenomenon. 8 Likewise there are
analysts and commentators who deny that the Declaration of In-
dependence stood for principles of self-determination in any sense
beyond the American case against the government of George III."
What is significant, however, for the meaning of autonomy and the
historical models of the past, is that for all its promise, and for all the
achievements under what must be termed, in the light of modern ex-
perience, benign British rule, the great American experiment ultimate-
ly failed. Britain learned its lessons well, and its English-speaking
possessions thereafter remained in one form or another associated
with the British Crown. When twilight finally came to the British Em-
pire, autonomy, where it did exist, gave way again-more gracefully
than in the past- to national independence.
69. MILLER, supra note 42, at 468-69.
70. GIPSON, supra note 42, at 217.
71. Quoted in CHRISTIE & LABAREE, supra note 42, at 281.
72. LACY, supra note 13, at 113. Contra, CHURCHILL, supra note 39, at 176.
73. See 1 R. PALMER, THE AGE OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1760-1800-THE CHALLENGE 5-23 (1959).
74. Mansfield, The Right of Revolution, 105 DAEDALUS 151, 152-54, 161 (1976). But see
Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-Political Inquiry, [1975] DET. Civ. LIB. REV. 71,
74-75.
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Traditional international law emphasizes sovereignty and ter-
ritoriality, and governmental power provides a firm linkage between
them. 5 Autonomy in law, politics, and history has only been useful in a
transitional sense. It has not and cannot represent a permanent resolu-
tion to the tenuous relationship between self-regulation and self-rule.
That is the continuing reality of the American Revolution for
twentieth-century dissident peoples and nationalist regimes.
75. See generally G. SCHWARZENBERGER, POWER POLITICS: A STUDY OF WORLD SOCIETY
(3d ed. 1964); Lacouture, Cambodia the Hostage, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 5 & 12, 1980, at13
(illustrates the continuing confusion over the nature of autonomy when he refers to a
"merely formal autonomy like that with which Czechoslovakia must content itself").
